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Rise of the Super-Legislature:  Demanding a More Exacting 
Monetary Exaction 
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District
1
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District was a recent 
decision by the United States Supreme Court on the subject of land-use 
regulations and their interaction with the Takings Clause of the Constitution’s 
Fifth Amendment.  In this case, the petitioner, Koontz, sought to drain and 
build on a section of his property that had been designated as protected 
wetlands by the state of Florida.
2
  To do this, he needed to apply for permits.  
In Florida, applicants were required to help mitigate or offset the 
environmental effects of their proposed improvements.
3
  One of the options 
for doing so was by “creating, enhancing, or preserving wetlands 
elsewhere.”4 
The question the Court addressed in this case was whether a monetary 





in Fifth Amendment Takings Clause jurisprudence.  The Court held that such 
exactions must be in accordance with the principles set out in Nollan and 
Dolan – meaning: if monetary exactions are demanded as a condition of a 
land-use permit, then they must have an essential nexus and rough 
proportionality to the adverse impacts of the proposed development.  
This case is important because it seems to complicate the process by 
which land-use regulations are enforced and further limits local governments’ 
authority to control how their communities are shaped.  Though not all 
                                                 
1
 133 S.Ct. 2586 (2013). 
2
 Id. at 2591. Coy Koontz, Jr., the petitioner in this case, represented the estate of Coy 
Koontz, Sr., the owner of the land in question.  For ease of reference, the Court and this 
casenote will refer to both men as “petitioner” or “Koontz.”  Id. at 2591 n. 1. 
3




 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n., 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
6
 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
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consequences are known at this time, the instant decision seems to give 
further power to the individual landowner, who may now have an easier time 
ignoring the negative externalities that his developments have on the 
surrounding community. There is also the possibility that this decision 
actually only creates inefficiencies in the process of obtaining land-use 
permits. I will argue that both of these issues are likely to arise because of 
this holding in the comment section of this casenote.  
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
In 1972, Petitioner Koontz purchased a 14.9-acre piece of land on the 
south side of Florida State Road 50.
7
  The property was located less than 
1,000 feet from that road’s intersection with Florida State Road 408.8 A 
drainage ditch runs along the property’s western edge, and high-voltage 
power lines bisect the property into northern and southern sections.
9
  The 3.7-
acre northern section of Petitioner’s property is isolated from the 11-acre 
southern section by the ditch, a the 100-foot wide area kept clear for the 
power lines, the highways, and other construction on nearby land.
10
  
Respondent was the St. Johns River Water Management District 
(District), created in 1972 as a part of Florida’s Water Resources Act, which 
divided the state into five water management districts.
11
  The Act authorized 
the five districts to regulate “construction that connects to, draws water from, 
drains water into, or is placed in or across the waters in the state.”12  The Act 
forced a landowner that wanted to partake in such construction to obtain from 
his relevant district a Management and Storage of Surface Water (MSSW) 
permit, which may impose “such reasonable conditions” on the permit as are 
                                                 
7
 Koontz, 133 S.Ct. at 2591-92. 
8




 Id. at 2592-93. 
11
 Id. at 2592. 
12
 Id. (citing 1972 Fla. Laws ch. 72-299, pt. IV, § 1(5), pp. 1115-16 (codified as 
amended at Fla. Stat. § 373.403(5) (2010)). 
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“necessary to assure” that construction will “not be harmful to the water 
resources of the district.”13   
In 1984, seeking to protect the state’s diminishing wetlands, the 
Florida Legislature passed the Henderson Wetlands Protection Act, which 
made it illegal for anyone to “dredge or fill in, on, or over surface waters” 
without a Wetlands Resource Management (WRM) permit.
14
  In keeping 
with the Henderson Act, Respondent-District (the district with jurisdiction 
over Koontz’s land) required that applicants wanting to build on wetlands 
“offset the resulting environmental damage by creating, enhancing, or 
preserving wetlands elsewhere.”15  
Petitioner decided to develop the 3.7-acre northern section of his 
property, and in 1994 he applied to the District for the MSSW and WRM 
permits.
16
  In order to mitigate the environmental effects of his proposal, 
Koontz offered to foreclose any possible future development of the 11-acre 
southern section of his land by deeding a conservation easement over that 
portion of his property to the District.
17
 
The District responded that the 11-acre conservation easement would 
be inadequate and informed Koontz that it would approve the project “only if 
he agreed to one of two concessions.”18  The District’s proposals involved 
                                                 
13
 Id. (citing 1972 Fla. Laws § 4(1), at 1118 (codified as amended at Fla. Stat. § 
373.413(1))). 
14




 Id.  “Under his proposal, petitioner would have raised the elevation of the 
northernmost section of his land to make it suitable for a building, graded the land from the 
southern edge of the building site down to the elevation of the high-voltage electrical lines, 
and installed a dry-bed pond for retaining and gradually releasing stormwater runoff from the 
building and its parking lot.” Id. 
17
 Id. at 2592-93. 
18
 Id. at 2593.  In the dissent, Justice Kagan, citing Koontz’s testimony at trial, pointed 
out that these options were presented “only in broad strokes, ‘[n]ot in any great detail.’”  Id. 
at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing App. at 103). The District also “made it clear that it 
welcomed additional proposals from Koontz” and asked “if he ‘would be willing to go back 
with the staff over the next month and renegotiate this thing and try to come up with a 
solution.’”  Id. at 2611 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing App. at 37).  It was at this time that the 
District finally denied his applications.  Id. 
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Koontz reducing his development to one acre and deeding an easement to the 
District for the remaining 13.9 acres or, alternatively, he could build the 
development as proposed if he would pay for improvements to the District-
owned land several miles away.
19
  Those improvements involved replacing 
culverts or filling ditches, with the outcome enhancing “approximately 50 
acres of District-owned wetlands.”20  When applicants are given the option to 
fund offsite mitigation work, the District’s policy is “never to require any 
particular offsite project[;]” rather, the District, as it did here, will inform 
applicants that it “would also favorably consider” alternatives to its suggested 
projects if petitioner proposed something “equivalent.”21   
Koontz believed the District’s mitigation demands to be excessive in 
proportion to the environmental effects that his building would have caused 
and filed a suit in state court.
22
  The District found that Koontz’s applications 
“did not preserve wetlands or protect fish and wildlife to the extent Florida 
law required.”23  Instead of rejecting the applications outright, however, the 
District suggested ways Koontz could modify the applications so that they 
could meet the legal requirements.
24
  Koontz argued, among other things, that 
he was “entitled to relief under Fla. Stat. § 373.617(2), which allows an 
owner to recover monetary damages if a state agency’s action is ‘an 
                                                 
19
 Id.  “To reduce the development area, the District suggested that petitioner could 
eliminate the dry-bed pond from his proposal and instead install a more costly stormwater 
management system beneath the building site. The district also suggested that petitioner 
install retaining walls rather than gradually sloping the land from the building site down to 
the elevation of the rest of his property to the south.” Id.  Kagan summed up the situation: the 
“District never made a demand or set a condition – not to cede an identifiable property 
interest, not to undertake particular mitigation project, not even to write a check to the 
government.  Id. at 2610-11. 
20
 Id. at 2593. 
21
 Id. (citing Joint Appendix at 75, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 




 Id. at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
24
 Id.  
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unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power constituting a taking 
without just compensation.’”25   
After the Florida Circuit Court granted the District’s motion to 
dismiss because Koontz had not exhausted his state-administrative remedies, 
the Florida District Court for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded.
26
  
After a two-day bench trial, the Circuit Court held the District’s actions 
violated Nollan and Dolan.
27
 After hearing testimony from several experts 
who examined petitioner’s property, the Circuit Court found that “the 
property’s northern section had already been ‘seriously degraded’ by 
extensive construction on the surrounding parcels.’”28  The Circuit Court 
concluded, “any further mitigation in the form of payment for offsite 
improvements to District property lacked both a nexus and rough 
proportionality to the environmental impact of the proposed construction.”29 
This ruling was affirmed by the Florida District Court in 2009 but 
then reversed by the Florida Supreme Court in 2011, which distinguished this 
case from Nollan and Dolan on two grounds.
30
  The first significant 
distinction was that “unlike Nollan or Dolan, the District did not approve 
petitioner’s application on the condition that he accede to the District’s 
demands; instead, the District denied his application because he refused to 
make concessions.”31  The Florida Supreme Court also found a distinction 
between “a demand for an interest in real property (what happened in Nollan 
and Dolan) and a demand for money.”32  After acknowledging a “division of 
authority over whether a demand for money can give rise to a claim under 
Nollan and Dolan, Florida’s Supreme Court “sided with those courts that 
have said it cannot.”33  The Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of 
                                                 
25
 Id. at 2593 (citing Fla. Stat. Ann. § 373.617(2) (West 2013) (outlining the judicial 






 Id. (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. 






 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
32
 Id. at 2594 (citation omitted). 
33
 Id. (citation omitted). 
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certiorari because the issue was a federal constitutional question that has 
divided the lower courts.
34
   
In the instant decision, the Court reversed the Florida Supreme 
Court’s holding. The Court addressed both distinctions the Florida Supreme 
Court relied on to allow denial of the permit and remanded the case for 
further proceedings to determine if the District’s actions complied with the 
principles set forth in the opinion and Nollan and Dolan.
35
  The Supreme 
Court held that when a government agency decides whether and how a permit 
applicant is required to mitigate the impacts of a proposed development, “it 
may not leverage its legitimate interest in mitigation to pursue government 
ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to those 
impacts.”36 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
For this case, it is important to have background information on both 
the broad category of modern regulatory takings and the more specific 
category of land-use exactions, and also a brief history of the police powers 
and economic substantive due process law. 
Modern Regulatory Takings 
Modern regulatory takings laws have been shaped primarily by the 









Previous to Mahon, the typical taking requiring “just compensation” was 
only for a “direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private 
property.”41  Justice Holmes, writing for the Mahon Court, “charted a 




 Id. at 2603. 
36
 Id. at 2595. 
37
 Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
38
 Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
39
 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
40
 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
41
 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005). 
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significant new course ... when he opined that a state law making it 
‘commercially impracticable to mine certain coal’ had ‘very nearly the same 
effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.”42  That 
Court held that “[t]he general rule at least is that while property may be 
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as 
a taking.”43   The question, as Justice O’Connor pointed out in Lingle, “has 
been – and remains – how to discern how far is ‘too far.’”44   
The Supreme Court has found two categories of regulatory action that 
are generally considered “per se takings for Fifth Amendment purposes.”45  
The first is laid out in Loretto, which held that “permanent physical 
occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public 
interests that it may serve.”46  A second category of government action 
considered a taking was laid out in Lucas, which held that when an owner of 
real property is “called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in 
the name of the common good… he has suffered a taking.”47  The 
government must pay just compensation for these “‘total regulatory takings,’ 
except to the extent that ‘background principles of nuisance and property 
law’ independently restrict the owner’s intended use of the property.”48  
If regulatory takings claims fall outside these two limited categories 
and the “special context of land-use exactions,” they are governed by the 
standards set forth in Penn Central, in which the Court “acknowledged that it 
had hitherto been unable to develop any set formula for evaluating regulatory 
takings claims.”49  The Court identified “several factors that have particular 
significance,” with the most important being “the economic impact of the 
                                                 
42
 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 406 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414). 
43
 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. 
44




 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). 
47
 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (emphasis in 
original). 
48
 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-32). 
49
 Id. 
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regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the 
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.”50   
Land-Use Exactions 
Land-use exactions present a special type of Fifth Amendment 
takings question because they address whether a regulation that places a 
condition on proposed development of private property is constitutional.  The 
foundation of this law in the paramount Nollan and Dolan cases has been as 
contentious as the case in question now, which extends those holdings.  
Nollan and Dolan held that the government “may not condition the approval 
of a land-use permit on the owner’s relinquishment of a portion of his 
property unless there is a ‘nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ between the 
government’s demand and the effects of the proposed land use.”51  These 
holdings were premised on the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which 
states that the government: 
may not require a person to give up a constitutional 
right – here, the right to receive just compensation when 
property is taken for a public use – in exchange for a 
discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the 
benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property.
52
  
The basics of a typical Nollan/Dolan test are as follows:  A court 
must “first determine whether the ‘essential nexus’ exists between the 
‘legitimate state interest’ and the permit condition exacted by the city.”53  If 
that nexus is found, the court must then decide “the required degree of 
connection between the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed 
development.”54  The Dolan Court thought that the term “rough 
proportionality” best encapsulated the requirement of Fifth Amendment.  The 
Court stressed that “[n]o precise mathematical calculation [was] required,” 
                                                 
50
 Penn Central Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,124 (1978). 
51
 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.Ct. 2586, 2695 (2013). 
52
 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. 
53
 Id. at 386 (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837). 
54
 Id. 
JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 21, NO. 1 
283 
but rather the government must make some sort of “individualized 
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent 
to the impact of the proposed development.”55   
The Court considered land-use exactions again in City of Monterey v. 
Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.
56
  In that case, a city government 
repeatedly denied proposals by a builder to develop a piece of land, each time 
“imposing more rigorous demands on the developers.”57  The Court 
addressed, among other things, “whether the Court of Appeals erred in 
assuming the rough-proportionality standard of [Dolan] applied….”58  The 
Del Monte Court found that it had never “extended the rough-proportionality 
test of Dolan beyond the special context of exactions – land-use decisions 
conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property to public 
use.”59  The Court emphasized that the proportionality test “was not designed 
to address, and is not readily applicable to, the much different questions 
arising where … the landowner’s challenge is based not on excessive 
exactions but on denial of development.”60 
The question and extension of law in the instant case addressed the 
use of monetary exactions, which are situations in which the government 
“conditions a permit not on the transfer of real property, but instead on the 
payment or expenditure of money.”61  In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,62 the 
                                                 
55
 Id. at 391.  See B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 282 P.3d 41 (Utah 2012) 
(Affirming a trial court’s finding that the County’s “highway dedication” ordinance, which 
imposed as a condition of a construction permit for any developer seeking permits for any 
“parcel of land [abutting a] public street which does not conform to current county [road] 
width standards,” forced the developer to dedicate and improve the additional street width 
necessary for conformity with the county road-width standards).  The Utah Supreme Court 
found that the “County’s purpose for imposing the exaction was to alleviate B.A.M.’s impact 
(increased traffic) on a state-owned – and state-funded – highway… Because the County’s 
purpose for imposing the exaction was to alleviate the development’s impact on a state-
funded road, the state’s costs of improving that road are a proper measure of the 
development’s impact.”  Id. at 47. 
56
 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
57
 Id. at 693-94. 
58
 Id. at 702. 
59
 Id. (emphasis added). 
60
 Id. at 703 (emphasis added). 
61
 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.Ct. 2586, 2603 (2013) (Kagan, J., 
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Court addressed whether a federal statute that required a former mining 
company to pay a large sum of money for the health benefits of retired 
employees created an unconstitutional taking, as applied to that petitioner.
63
  
The Court held: “the government may impose ordinary financial obligations 
without triggering the Takings Clause’s protections.”64  Five members of a 
divided Apfel Court determined that the law “did not effect a taking, 
distinguishing between the appropriation of a specific property interest and 
the imposition of an order to pay money.”65  Justice Kennedy, in an opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part to the plurality’s holding, wrote that 
the federal statute “[did] not operate upon or alter an identified property 
interest.”66  He continued, “[t]he law simply imposes an obligation to 
perform an act, the payment of benefits.”67  Justice Kennedy also pointed out 
that “[t]o the extent it affects property interest, it does so in a manner similar 
to many laws; but until [that day], none were thought to constitute takings.”68  
Before recapping the many Supreme Court cases that addressed whether a 
regulatory taking occurred, Justice Kennedy reiterated that the “one constant 
limitation has been that in all of the cases where the regulatory taking 
analysis has been employed, a specific property right or interest has been at 
stake.”69  He cautioned that the Court has “been careful not to lose sight of 
the importance of identifying the property allegedly taken, lest all 
government action be subjected to examination against taking without just 
compensation, with the attendant potential for money damages.”70  In Apfel, 
the statute in question “neither target[ed] a specific property interest nor 
depend[ed] upon any particular property for the operation of its statutory 
mechanisms.”71  Acknowledging that the cost imposed on the coal company 
                                                                                                                         
dissenting). 
62
 524 U.S. 498 (1998). 
63
 Id. at 503-04. 
64
 Koontz, 133 S.Ct. at 2603-04 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
65
 Id. at 2605. 
66
 Apfel, 524 U.S. at 540 (J. Kennedy concurring in part and dissenting in part) 






 Id. at 541 (emphasis added). 
70
 Id. at 543 (emphasis added). 
71
 Id. 
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will “no doubt reduce its net worth and its total value,” Kennedy pointed out 
that “this can be said of any law which has an adverse economic effect.”72   
Police Powers and Economic Substantive Due Process 
In the seminal Carolene Products
73
 case, the Court held that “exercise 
of police power [would] be upheld if any state of facts either known or which 
could be reasonably assumed afford[ed] support for it.”74  Dissenting in 
Nollan, Justice Brennan pointed out that in the arena of police power, which 
connotes the “time-tested conceptional limit of public encroachment upon 
private interests[,]” the Court generally refrained from announcing any 
standard except that of “reasonableness.”75  The typical statement of the rule 
was that “it must appear, first, that the interest of the public … require 
government interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably 
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive 
upon individuals.”76  More important to the inquiry in the instant case is that 
the Court “has often said that ‘debatable questions as to reasonableness are 
not for the courts but for the legislature….’”77 
Carolene Products ended what was commonly known as the 
Lochner
78
 era – a period during which the Due Process Clause was used by 
the Court to “strike down laws which [it] thought were unreasonable, that is, 
unwise or incompatible with some particular economic or social 
philosophy.”79  In Skrupa, Justice Black announced that the Court had 
“returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not 
substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative 




 U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
74
 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962) (citing Carolene 
Products, 304 U.S. at 154). 
75
 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n., 483 U.S. at 843 n.1 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594-95). 
76
 Id. (quoting Goldblatt, 369 U.S. 594-95) (citations omitted). 
77
 Id. (citing Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932); Goldblatt, 369 U.S. 590, 
594-95 (1962)) (emphasis added). 
78
 Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 
(1963). 
79
 Skrupa, 372 U.S. at 729. 
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bodies, who are elected to pass laws.”80  Without mincing any words, Black 
announced:  
We refuse to sit as a superlegislature to weigh the 
wisdom of legislation, and we emphatically refuse to go back 
to the time when courts used the Due Process Clause to strike 
down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial 
conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out 
of harmony with a particular school of thought.  Nor are we 
willing to draw lines by calling a law ‘prohibitory’ or 
‘regulatory.’81 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
Writing for the majority in a 5-4 decision, Justice Alito analyzed the 
framework of Fifth Amendment Takings Clause case law laid out in Nollan 
and Dolan as applied to the facts of this case.
82
  The Court began its analysis 
by discussing the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which “vindicates 
the Constitution’s enumerated rights by preventing the government from 
coercing people into giving them up.”83  In this situation, the Court found the 
District’s “demands” were prohibited by the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine because they “frustrate[d] the Fifth Amendment right to just 
compensation.”84 
The instant case was distinguished from the Nollan and Dolan cases 
in one way. It addressed a government order written as “condition precedent” 
to permit approval, as opposed to “condition subsequent” to approval.85  
Under the Florida Supreme Court’s holding, a “government order stating that 
a permit is ‘approved if’ the owner turns over property would be subject to 
Nollan and Dolan, but an identical order that uses the words ‘denied until’ 
                                                 
80
 Id. at 730. 
81
 Id. at 731-32 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
82
 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013). 
83
 Id. at 2594. 
84
 Id. at 2595.   
85
 Id. 
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would not.”86  The Court pointed out that “unconstitutional conditions cases 
have long refused to attach significance to the distinction between conditions 
precedent and conditions subsequent” and that doing so now would 
effectively render Nollan and Dolan a “dead letter.”87 
The Court next confirmed that the Takings Clause could be violated 
despite no property actually being taken.
88
  It held that “[e]xtortionate 
demands” for property during the land-use permitting process can violate the 
Takings Clause “not because they take property but because they 
impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken without just 
compensation.”89  The Court found that just as in other unconstitutional 
conditions cases in which someone refused to give up a constitutional right, 
the “impermissible denial of a governmental benefit is a constitutionally 
cognizable injury.”90   
There is a relevant difference, however, between a “consummated 
taking” and the refusal of a permit based on an “unconstitutionally 
extortionate demand.”91  The Court pointed out that, “[w]hile the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine recognizes that this burdens a 
constitutional right, the Fifth Amendment mandates a particular remedy – just 
compensation – only for takings.”92  The Court reasoned that “[i]n cases 
where there is an excessive demand but no taking, whether money damages 
are available is not a question of federal constitutional law but of the cause of 
action – whether state or federal – on which the landowner relies.”93  The 
Court found that because Koontz filed his claim under state law, the Court 
                                                 
86
 Id. at 2595-96. 
87
 Id. at 2596. 
88






 Id. at 2597. 
92
 Id. (emphasis in original). On this point, Justice Kagan, writing for the dissent, agreed; 
Kagan pointed out that a property owner is “entitled to have the improper condition 
removed; and he may be entitled to a monetary remedy created by state law for imposing 
such a condition; but he cannot be entitled to constitutional compensation for a taking of 
property.”  Id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
93
 Koontz, 133 S.Ct. at 2597.  
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The District made several other arguments that mostly raised 
questions of Florida procedural law, which the Court determined were not for 
it to decide.
95
  However, the Court also held, “to the extent … that the posture 
of this case creates some federal obstacle to adjudicating petitioner’s 
unconstitutional conditions claim, [the Court] remand[s] for the Florida 
courts to consider that argument in the first instance.”96 
The District argued that this Court did not need to decide whether its 
suggested offsite mitigation satisfied Nollan and Dolan because the District 
gave Koontz another option for obtaining permit approval.”97  The District 
also argued that “regardless of whether its demands for offsite mitigation 
satisfied Nollan and Dolan, [the Court] must separately consider each of the 
petitioner’s options, one of which did not require any of the offsite work the 
                                                 
94
 Id.  
95
 Id.  The District argued the Court could affirm on procedural grounds that “the 
petitioner brought his unconstitutional conditions claim in the wrong forum. Id.  However, 
only “[t]wo members of the Florida Supreme Court credited” this argument, with “four 
others refusing to address it.” Id.  The Court “decline[d] respondent’s invitation to second-
guess a State Supreme Court’s treatment of its own procedural law.” Id.   
The District also asked the Court to affirm the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling because 
“petitioner sued for damages but is at most entitled to an injunction ordering his permit issue 
without any conditions.”  Id.  The Court found that it did not need to decide whether “federal 
law authorizes plaintiffs to recover damages for unconstitutional conditions claims 
predicated on the Takings Clause because petitioner brought his claim under state law.”  Id. 
(emphasis in original).  The Court differs to that as an issue of state law, which the Florida 
Supreme Court “did not address and on which [the Court] will not opine.”  Id. at 2598.   
Similarly, the Court did not address the District’s argument that its demands were “too 
indefinite to give rise to liability under Nollan and Dolan because that question was “beyond 
the scope” of the questions that the Court agreed to review.  Id.  It noted that if preserved, 
that issue “remains open on remand for the Florida Supreme Court to address.”  Id. 
96
 Id. at 2597. 
97
 Id. at 2598. The District would have approved a “revised permit application” if 
petitioner had reduced the size of his construction site “from 3.7 acres to 1 acre and placed a 
conservation easement on the remaining 13.9 acres of petitioner’s land.”  Id.  The dissent 
pointed out that the District made it clear that additional proposals were welcome.  See supra 
note 17. 
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trial court found objectionable.”98  The Court found this argument flawed 
because the District’s alternative suggestion “misapprehends the 
governmental benefit that petitioner was denied.”99  Koontz sought to build 
on the full 3.7 acres of land, but the District “in effect told petitioner that it 
would not allow him to build on 2.7 of those acres unless he agreed to spend 
money improving public lands.”100  Because “petitioner claims he was 
wrongfully denied a permit to build on those 2.7 acres …, [the District]’s 
offer to approve a less ambitious building project does not obviate the need to 
determine whether the demand for offsite mitigation satisfied Nollan and 
Dolan.”101 
The second major issue that the Court addressed in the present case is 
the Florida Supreme Court’s alternative holding that Koontz’s “claim fails 
because respondent asked him to spend money rather than give up an 
easement on his land.”102  The Court started this section of its holding by 
stating that a “predicate for any unconstitutional conditions claim is that the 
government could not have constitutionally ordered the person asserting the 
claim to do what it attempted to pressure that person into doing.”103  The 
Court then announced, “if the government had directly seized the easements 
it sought to obtain through the permitting process, it would have committed a 
per se taking.”104   
The Court held that monetary exactions must satisfy Nollan and 
Dolan’s nexus and rough proportionality requirements.105  It found that 
without this requirement, it would be easy for the government to evade the 
limitations of those cases.
106
  The Court feared that a government could 
simply give the permit-requesting owner a choice between surrendering an 
                                                 
98












 Id. at 2598-99. 
105
 Id. at 2599. 
106
 Id. The government would only need to “provide a permit applicant with one 
alternative that satisfies the nexus and rough proportionality standards.” Id. 
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easement or making a payment equal to its value.
107
  Because these sorts of 
“‘in lieu of’” fees were “utterly commonplace” and “functionally equivalent 
to other types of land use exactions[,]” the Court held that “‘monetary 
exactions’ must satisfy the nexus and rough proportionality requirements of 
Nollan and Dolan.”108 
Both the majority and dissent addressed Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel. 
The majority distinguished the instant case from Apfel by finding that unlike 
the financial obligation in Apfel, the demand here “‘operate[d] upon … an 
identified property interest’” by requiring the owner of a “particular piece of 
property” to make a payment.109  The Court found this situation similar to 
cases “holding that the government must pay just compensation when it takes 
a lien – a right to receive money that is secured by a particular piece of 
property.”110  It reasoned that the “fulcrum this case turns on is the direct link 
between the government’s demand and a specific parcel of real property,” 
and that 
[b]ecause of that direct link, this case implicates the 
central concern of Nollan and Dolan : the risk that the 
government may use its substantial power and discretion in 
land-use permitting to pursue governmental ends that lack an 
essential nexus and rough proportionality to the effects of the 
proposed new use of the specific property at issue, thereby 
diminishing without justification the value of the property.
111
 




 Id.  The dissent suggested that this is a “prophylaxis in search of a problem” because 
no evidence was brought forward that suggests local governments are evading Nollan and 
Dolan by “extort[ing] the surrender of real property interest having no relation to a 
development’s costs.”  Koontz, 133 S.Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  Kagan continued, 
saying that court could use the “Penn Central framework, the Due Process Clause, and (in 
many places) state law to protect against monetary demands, whether or not imposed to 
evade Nollan and Dolan, that simply go too far.”  Id. at 2609.  
109
 Koontz, 133 S.Ct. at 2599 (quoting Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540 




 Id. at 2600 (emphasis added).  The dissent viewed this issue differently and focused 
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Addressing the dissent’s proposition that this situation calls for a 
Penn Central test, rather than a Nollan/Dolan one, the majority stated that 
Koontz did not ask the Court to hold that the government could commit a 
“regulatory taking by directing someone to spend money.”112  Rather, it said 
that Koontz’s claim rested on the 
more limited proposition that when the government 
commands the relinquishment of funds linked to a specific, 
identifiable property interest, such as a bank account or parcel 
                                                                                                                         
on the fact that Koontz claimed the District ask that he spend money to improve public 
wetlands, and “… not that he hand over a real property interest.”  Id. at 2605 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added).  The dissent believed the key question to be:  “Independent of 
the permitting process, does requiring a person to pay money to the government, or spend 
money on its behalf, constitute a taking requiring just compensation?”  Id.  The dissent found 
that this question has already been answered “no” in Apfel where Kennedy’s controlling 
opinion explained that the law “did not operate upon or alter a specific and identified 
property or property right.  Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
Rather, “the law simply impose[d] an obligation to perform an act, the payment of benefits. 
The statute is indifferent as to how the regulated entity elects to comply or the property it 
uses to do so.”  Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted).  It follows then that requiring a 
person pay money to repair public wetlands is not a taking because that order “does not 
affect a specific and identified property or property right; it simply imposes an obligation to 
perform an act… that costs money.”  Id. at 2606 (internal quotes and citations omitted) 
(emphasis added).  Thus, the dissent concluded that because the District is only requiring a 
“general liability” to pay money and is “indifferent as to how the regulated entity elects to 
comply or the property it uses to do so,” therefore the order does not constitute a taking and 
does not trigger the Nollan/Dolan test.  Id. (internal quote and citations omitted).  
112
 Id. at 2600. The dissent pointed out that this test “fits to a T a complaint (like 
Koontz’s) that a permitting condition makes it inordinately expensive to develop land” 
because it specifically “protects against regulations that unduly burden an owner’s use of his 
property.”  Id. at 2609 n. 3 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  Kagan continued: the Due Process Clause 
provides an “additional backstop” against excessive permit fees by preventing “a government 
from conditioning a land-use permit on a monetary requirement that is ‘basically arbitrary.’”  
Id. (citing Apfel, 524 U.S. at 557-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).  The dissent summarized that 
Nollan and Dolan stop “governments from using the permitting process to do what the 
Takings Clause would otherwise prevent – i.e., take a specific property interest without just 
compensation,” but that those cases were not applicable when governments “impose a 
general financial obligation as part of the permitting process.”  Id. at 2609 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
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of real property, a ‘per se [takings] approach’ is the proper 
mode of analysis under the Court’s precedent.113 
The majority also noted that Koontz’s claim “[did] not implicate 
‘normative considerations about the wisdom of government decisions,’” and 
was not “concerned with whether it would be ‘arbitrary or unfair’ for 
respondent to order a landowner to make improvements to public lands that 
are nearby.”114  Ultimately, the Court concluded that “[w]hatever the wisdom 
of such a policy,” because “it would transfer an interest in property from the 
landowner to the government …, any such demand would amount to a per se 
taking similar to the taking of an easement or a lien.”115 
The majority then addressed and dismissed the dissent’s contention 
that there would be no “principled” way to distinguish unconstitutional land-
use exactions from property taxes if monetary exactions were subject to the 
Nollan/Dolan test.
116
  The Court reaffirmed that it is “beyond dispute that 
taxes and user fees … are not takings,” and declared that this case did “not 
affect the ability of governments to impose property taxes, user fees, and 
similar laws and regulations that may impose financial burdens on property 
owners.”117   
The Court acknowledged that it had found takings where the 
government, “by confiscating financial obligations, achieved a result that 
could have been obtained by imposing a tax.”118  But it dismissed this dissent 
critique by stating that this issue is “not a creature of [its] holding today,” but 
rather “inherent” to the “long-settled view that property the government 
could constitutionally demand through its taxing power can also be taken by 
                                                 
113
 Id. at 2600 (citing Brown v. Legal Foundation of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003)). 
114




 Id.  The majority believed the dissent “exaggerate[d] both the extent to which that 
problem is unique to the land-use permitted context and the practical difficulty of 
distinguishing between the power to tax and the power to take by imminent domain.” Id. 
117
 Id. at 2600-01 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
118
 Id. at 2601. 
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eminent domain.”119  The Court disposed of this question easily, finding that 
much like the government in Brown,
120
 here, the District never argued that its 




Finally, the majority addressed the dissent’s belief that this decision 
would hinder local governments from charging reasonable permitting fees.
122
  
It dismissed this notion, stating that “[n]umerous courts” have utilized the 
Nollan/Dolan test over the past twenty years, “[y]et the ‘significant practical 
harm’ the dissent predicts has not come to pass.”123  The majority suggested 
that the dissent actually argues to overrule Nollan and Dolan, however, 
“[m]indful of the special vulnerability of land use permit applicants to 
extortionate demands for money,” the Court rejected the dissent’s contention 
that “other constitutional doctrines leave no room for the nexus and rough 
proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan.”124 
Summarizing the majority’s holding, Alito reiterated that the 
“government’s demand for property from a land-use must satisfy the 
requirements of Nollan and Dolan even when the government denies the 
permit and even when its demand is for money.”125  The Court did not come 
to a conclusion on the merits of Koontz’s claim, but reversed the Florida 
Supreme Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with the opinion.
126
 
V.  COMMENT 
I found problematic issues both specific to the analysis of the 
regulatory takings claim in the instant case and the family of land-use 
                                                 
119
 Id.  
120
 Brown v. Legal Foundation of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003).  In Brown, the 
government body acting as respondent was the State of Washington’s Supreme Court, which 
was not allowed to levy a tax. Id. at 228. 
121
 Koontz, 133 S.Ct. at 2601-02 (citing Fla. Stat. §§ 373.503, 373.109).  
122
 Id. at 2602. 
123
 Id. (quoting the dissent at 2607). 
124
 Id. at 2602-03.  
125
 Id. at 2603. 
126
 Id. 
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exaction cases extended by this ruling.  First, I will address problems with the 
depiction of the instant case.  Second, I will explain how this new limitation 
on a local government’s ability to regulate land-use by the manner in which a 
State Legislature has prescribed illustrates a rise of the Court acting as a 
super-legislature.  Finally, I will explain the likely consequences of the 
Court’s decision, which includes injury to the general public and obstruction 
to legislatively enacted environmental sustainability efforts because private 
landowners will be allowed to ignore the negative externalities created by 
their actions. 
In this case, the District believed that Koontz’s dredging and building 
on his private Florida wetlands would adversely affect the surrounding 
public.  In attempting to enforce the Henderson Wetlands Protection Act, 
passed by Florida’s legislature, the District responded to Koontz’s permit 
application by entering into negotiations with him as to appropriate 
mitigation options to offset the damage his construction would cause.
127
 
It was in the midst of these discussions that Koontz broke off 
discussions and filed a Takings Clause claim.  Instead of simply rejecting 
Koontz’s applications, the District suggested ways he could modify them in 
order to meet the state’s legal requirements.128  In addition to proposing that 
Koontz reduce the size of his proposed development or modify the design to 
                                                 
127
 Upon reading the dissent’s more complete version of the facts and the Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection’s brief, we learn that this sort of negotiation is 
typical.  The brief explained: 
… [E]nvironmental permitting involves a series of interactions 
between the permitting agency and the developer, requiring numerous and 
complicated degrees of analysis and negotiation to ensure that statutory 
compliance is maintained and that growth and resource protection are 
balance. Given the tightly-regulated and site-specific nature of 
environmental permitting, and in an effort to bring efficiency to the 
process, applicants are strongly encouraged to consult with agency staff 
before and during the process to identify appropriate mitigation options 
that will permit the project to proceed.  
Brief for Fla. Dept. of Environ. Prot. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Koontz 133 S.Ct. 2586 (2013) (No. SC09-713), 2009 WL 4761534, at *9. 
128
 See supra page 4-5.  
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lessen its adverse impact on the wetlands, the District “raised several options 
for ‘off-site mitigation’ that Koontz could undertake in a nearby nature 
preserve, thus compensating for the loss of wetlands his project would 
cause.”129  Kagan’s dissent further noted that the District never made any 
specific demand with regard to an off-site project and made clear that it 
“welcomed additional proposals” from Koontz to mitigate his plan’s damage 
to the wetlands.
130
  Kagan summed up the situation:  the “District never made 
a demand or set a condition – not to cede an identifiable property interest, not 
to undertake a particular mitigation project, not even to write a check to the 
government.”131  Rather, the District simply denied his permit it its current 
form and made a few suggestions to Koontz as to how his applications could 
conform to state law.  
One of the most detrimental aspects of the majority’s holding is its 
description of the District’s actions in this case.  Consider the majority’s 
framing of those actions:  the District told Koontz that it would approve 
construction “only if he agreed to one of two concessions,”132 against the 
description of the interaction laid out by Kagan and the Joint Appendix of the 
parties. Also consider the Florida Department of Environmental Protection’s 
description of the process and rationale for it, highlighting the encouraged 
communication between parties to “increase efficiency” of the process.133   
The majority’s depiction of the District’s actions puts a local 
government in a precarious situation when attempting to enforce its land-use 
permitting process.  Simply by suggesting ways Koontz could modify his 
application to meet Florida’s legal requirements, the majority found that 
District has made a “demand,” possibly worthy of Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause protection.  This severely limits a government lawyer’s actions in 
these types of cases.  Echoing parts of Justice Kagan’s decent, Professor John 
Echeverria of Vermont Law School wrote that the Courts’ decision “will very 
likely encourage local government officials to avoid any discussion with 
developers related to permit conditions that, in the end, might have let both 
                                                 
129
 See supra page 4 and note 21. 
130
 See supra page 4 and note 18. 
131
 See supra page 4 and note 18; Koontz, 133 S.Ct. at 2611 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
132
 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
133
 See supra p. 19 and n. 127. 
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sides find common ground on building projects that are good for the 
community and environmentally sound.”134  Echeverria continued: “Rather 
than risk a lawsuit through an attempt at compromise, many municipalities 
will simply reject development applications outright – or, worse, accept 
development plans they shouldn’t.”135 
Assuming arguendo that the District made a demand on Koontz’s 
permit request, the question then is: When a government seeks to place a 
condition on the development of private land, should the government bear the 
heightened burden of proving to a court that there is nexus rough 
proportionality between the government interest justifying denial of the 
permit and the demand on the applicant?   
The majority claims that the District and dissent’s suggested course of 
action would lead to governments being able to circumvent the Nollan and 
Dolan test by simply asking for monetary exactions in place of real property 
exactions when giving land-use permits.  I believe, however, that this holding 
actually further circumvents previous Supreme Court precedent, outlined in 
Skrupa, which emphatically refused to allow courts to use the Due Process 
Clause acts as a “superlegislature” in this type of situation.  It is proper to 
recognize that a state’s environmental sustainability laws are a direct product 
of that state’s “economic or social philosophy.”136 Florida’s Henderson 
Wetlands Protection Act is a legitimate use of this power, helping further its 
interest of reducing the negative externalities that come with unfettered 
private property development.  
To completely understand the consequences of the Court’s extension 
of Nollan and Dolan, it is helpful to look at the concerns expressed when 
those rulings occurred.  Critics of those rulings, including Justice Stevens, 
believed those cases to mark the “resurrection of a species of due process 
                                                 
134
 John Echeverria, Op-Ed., A legal blow to sustainable development, N.Y. TIMES, June 





 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
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analysis that [was] firmly rejected decades ago.”137 Stevens recognized this in 
Dolan, where he hoped that the Court’s reliance on “First Amendment cases, 
and its candid disavowal of the term ‘rational basis’ to describe its new 
standard of review, d[id] not signify a reassertion of the kind of 
superlegislative power the Court exercised during the Lochner era.”138  The 
Court previously abandoned the economic substantive due process doctrine 
and deferred to legislatures to decide what was economically best when the 
Lochner era ended with the Carolene Products ruling.
139
 
Economic substantive due process has not consistently been 
recognized as being equivalent or even similar to the topic of regulatory 
takings; indeed the majority does not even mention it in the instant ruling.  
However, Stevens found that the regulatory takings doctrine, first imagined 
by Holmes in Mahon,
140
 had an “obvious kinship with the line of substantive 
due process cases that Lochner exemplified.”141  Stevens pointed out that in 
addition to having similar ancestry, both doctrines are “potentially open-
ended sources of judicial power to invalidate state economic 
regulations….”142   
Land-use regulatory cases like Nollan, Dolan, and now Koontz have 
supplied little real explanation why land-use regulations require an 
“independent layer of protection,” as compared to all other regulatory takings 
situations.
143
  The majority’s explanation that the essential nexus and rough 
proportionality test stops the government from “exploiting the landowner’s 
permit application to evade the constitutional obligation to pay for the 
property” falls short considering the Penn Central test already protects real 
                                                 
137
 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 405 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
138
 Id. at 409 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (omitting internal citations).  
139
 See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text. 
140
 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
141
 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 406-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
142
 Id. at 407.  
143
 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.Ct. 2856, 2604 (2013) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting). 
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property owner’s land value by protecting against regulations that “unduly 
burden an owner’s use of his property.”144 
Consider all regulatory takings claims, except those that are per se 
takings due to permanent physical occupation and governed by Loretto, as 
simply addressing the reduction in value to the owner’s private property.  
This idea is consistent with the Supreme Court regulatory takings opinions 
since Mahon, which acknowledged Holmes’ observation that “Government 
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be 
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”145  All 
regulations, whether on real property like land or personal property like cars, 
affect the economic value of that property. The Court recognized in Lingle 
that “government regulation – by definition – involves the adjustment of 
rights for the public good.”146  Supreme Court decisions since Mahon have 
effectively been trying to build rules that best determine how far is “too 
far.”147  
Though the Court acknowledged that there was no set formula for 
evaluating takings claims, all major factors addressed the economic position 
of the claimant.  The Lingle Court succinctly sums up the Court’s consistent 
look at takings as a matter of economics and value to the property owner: 
Although our regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot 
be characterized as unified, these three inquiries (reflected in 
Loretto, Lucas, and Penn Central) share a common 
touchstone.  Each aims to identify regulatory actions that are 
functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which 
government directly appropriates private property or ousts the 
owner from his domain….  In the Lucas context, of course, 
the complete elimination of a property’s value is the 
determinative factor.  And the Penn Central inquiry turns in 
                                                 
144
 See supra note 112. 
145
 Penn Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (emphasis added). 
146
 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 
444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979)).  
147
 Id. 
JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 21, NO. 1 
299 
large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a 
regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it 
interferes with the legitimate property interests.
148
 
This logical and understandable test of economic loss suffered by a 
property owner made a lot of sense, even if Lucas gave the government too 
much lee-way and Penn Central did not offer a set formula. It is 
disingenuous to the original and reasonable regulatory takings justifications 
to create a separate, higher burden for economic regulations on real property, 
as compared to other commerce.  It is even worse to create a higher burden 
that puts land-use regulations in the same category as the Lochner-era 
legislative economic regulations where courts are given the ultimate 
“superlegislative” power. 
After reading the Court’s disagreement over the applicability of Apfel 
to the instant case, it is still not clear whether Apfel was intended to affect 
land-use regulatory situations.
149
  The existence of that debate, however, 
illustrates the ridiculousness of using a heightened scrutiny standard for 
economic land-use regulations, as compared to other economic regulations.  
Even if the phrase “specified property” was intended to refer to the reason 
someone is paying an exaction, as the majority suggests, instead of the item 
of value with which a property owner is paying, it still makes more sense to 
maintain consistency in terms of how all property is treated in the exactions 
realm. 
The consequences of the instant decision that were predicted by 
Stevens in Dolan bring us closer, once again, to a Lochner era Court.  
Despite Stevens’ warning, the Court has clawed back more of the 
“superlegislative” power it once wielded during the Lochner era.  Now that a 
monetary exaction, or even the suggestion of a monetary exaction, has been 
conflated with a real property taking, it is difficult to see how this path to 
substantive economic due process will be altered.  Why would the Court not 
consider the next legislatively enacted economic burden on an individual 
with the same heightened scrutiny that the District is now facing?  
                                                 
148
 Id. at 539-40. 
149
 See supra, 16-17 for the majority and dissent’s complete argument. 
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In the meantime, it is easy to imagine governments shying away from 
utilizing monetary exactions, even when they make sense in situations like 
the instant case.  Ilya Somin, professor of Law at George Mason University 
School of Law, questions whether Koontz will impede beneficial regulation.  
Somin believes there is “no way to definitely prove that such risk aversion 
will never lead to the abandonment of potentially beneficial regulatory 
policies.”150  He does predict, however, “this constraint is likely to lead to 
better, rather than worse, regulatory policies.”151  He suggests that “[f]orcing 
governments to internalize the costs that their regulations impose on 
landowners, will strengthen incentives to adopt only those regulations whose 
benefits are likely to exceed their costs.”152   
While forcing governments to internalize costs sounds catchy and 
appealing, it is not what is occurring in actuality.  In fact that statement 
attacks the very goal of exactions, which is to specifically save those 
(external) costs from being the burden of the government and community.  
Instead of allowing the individual landowner to burden the entire community 
via environmental or actual monetary costs, the government is forcing the 
individual landowner to bear the actual costs his development creates.  
Somin’s view is that whereas previously officials “did not need to 
consider costs imposed on landowners in their calculus – unless the 
landowners could force them to do so through political lobbying – 
compensation requirements will impose tighter discipline and incentivize 
officials to concentrate regulatory expenditures in areas where they are likely 
to do the most good.”153  This very narrow view is of course only taking into 
consideration the one individual landowner who is being affected when a 
monetary exaction is demanded.  It ignores how the surrounding community 
of landowners, land-renters, and anyone else who might enjoy the air and 
water, might be affected by that individual’s decision.  Somin does, however, 
                                                 
150
 Somin, Ilya, Two Steps Forward for the 'Poor Relation' of Constitutional Law: 
Koontz, Arkansas Game & Fish, and the Future of the Takings Clause, CATO SUPREME 
COURT REVIEW 215 at 234, 2013, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2325529.  
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correctly describe how a landowner might appropriately fight this type of 
legislatively created statutory rule.  A landowner may do so the same way it 
was enacted when the Florida legislature decided it was a priority to save 
wetlands in 1972 and 1984 and gave control of wetland preservation to 
community water districts throughout the state.
154
 
Monetary exactions – like all exactions – are useful to governments 
and society because they shift the costs of some development off of 
community infrastructure and the local environment. These costs are shifted 
more directly onto those individuals responsible for straining them.  The 
individual’s negative externalities are internalized so that society as a whole 
is not forced to pay for individual property owner’s land-use decision.   
Being allowed to ignore the damages that an individual’s actions 
cause the surrounding community does indeed strengthen personal property 
rights, but does so at too high a cost.  It is possible that local governments 
will shift their tactics to offsetting these costs by raising taxes on the entire 
community, thus spreading out the costs that have been created by just a few 
individuals. Or local governments will simply discontinue environmentally 
friendly efforts, to the detriment of everyone in the community.   
This is perhaps the most consequential aspect of the Koontz ruling 
because it is unknown what will come from placing the Nollan/Dolan 
burdens onto permit conditions requiring the general expenditure of money.  
Professor Echeverria pointed out that many cities and towns “routinely attach 
fees and other payment obligations to permits, for example to support 
wetlands mitigation banks, to finance roads, to pay for new schools or to 
build affordable housing.”155  Though these mandates always had to be 
“reasonable under the Constitution,” the new standard raised the “burden on 
the government to justify the mandates….”156   This approach is “contrary to 
the traditional court approach of according deference to elected officials and 
technical experts on issues of regulatory policy.”157 
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 Supra notes 11, 14 and accompanying text. 
155
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Additionally, this will result in many more expensive legal challenges 
to local regulations by developers.
158
  Prior to this ruling, “judges typically 
deferred to local governments in such cases.”  After Koontz, however, 
“developers have a potent new legal tool to challenge such charges because 
now the legal burden of demonstrating their validity is on the communities 
themselves.”  In summary, Echeverria suggests that the “cost of protecting a 
community from a harmful building project now lies not with the developer 
but with the local residents and taxpayers.”159 
I will wrap up the comment section with one final quote from Justice 
Stevens, writing in dissent of the Dolan ruling:   
When there is doubt concerning the magnitude of [the 
impact of new urban developments on the risks of floods, 
earthquakes, traffic congestion, or environmental harms], the 
public interest in averting them must outweigh the private 
interest of the commercial entrepreneur.  If the government can 
demonstrate that the conditions it has imposed in a land use 
permit are rational, impartial and conducive to fulfilling the 
aims of a valid land use plan, a strong presumption of validity 
should attach to those conditions.  The burden of demonstrating 
that those conditions have unreasonably impaired the economic 
value of the proposed improvement belongs squarely on the 
shoulders of the party challenging the state action's 









 Id. (emphasis added).  For further examination of the evolution of exaction 
jurisprudence through Koontz, including examining the potential underlying considerations 
and looking ahead to potential limits on future holdings, see Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo 
M. Penalver, Exactions Creep, SUPREME COURT REVIEW (2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2345028.   
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 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 411 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
One of the purposes of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause is “to 
bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”161  It was never intended to prevent the Government from compelling 
an individual to bear or help compensate for the burdens that the individual 
placed on the public by his private actions.  As is sometimes the case, 
however, the Court has made it more difficult for local governments to 
protect their communities from the actions of individuals in the name of 
protecting one person’s individual liberty.  Koontz should have used the 
political tools that America’s founders intended for this type of situation if he 
was upset about regulations instead of asking for the Court to overturn the 
actions of a democratically elected legislature. 
I will conclude by briefly addressing how I believe the case should be 
ruled on remand.  The Court has remanded the case for the Florida courts to 
decide in the first instance whether the proposed demand on Koontz satisfies 
the Nollan and Dolan tests.  The Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection listed some examples in their brief to the Supreme Court of 
Florida supporting the Government of what it felt were appropriate mitigation 
demands during a permit negotiation.
162
  One example was:  if an applicant 
proposed building a home that impacted a bay swamp, appropriate mitigation 
would be the creation of a new area of bay swamp or to restore the conditions 
of an adversely-impacted, previously-existing bay swamp.
163
  Suggestions 
like this are not just reasonably related to Florida’s interest in preserving its 
important wetlands, but also reach the higher burden of having an essential 
nexus with this goal. Whether the District’s request is properly proportional 
to the damage that Koontz’s development will create is a question I do not 
have sufficient facts to answer.  It will be up to the Florida courts and 
scientists to decide both aspects of this test. 
                                                 
161
 Id. at 383 (quoting Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
162
 Amicus Brief for Fla. Dept. of Environ. Prot., supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
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 Id. 
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I believe a monetary exaction, when addressing the type of 
environmentally injurious project that a private citizen seeks a permit for, 
fulfills the essential nexus aspect of the Nollan/Dolan test.  Many possible 
projects that addressed environment rehabilitation could be funded by a 
monetary exaction from Koontz and should qualify as addressing the state’s 
environmental sustainability goal.  Nearly all would seem to satisfy the 
essential nexus between the “legitimate state interest” of protecting wetlands 
like those being destroyed and “the permit condition enacted,” which in this 
case would be demanding money to be used to help build or save similar 
wetlands in the area.
164
  Once it was determined where the money would go, 
all that would be required is to figure out what amount would create a rough 
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 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386-87 (internal quotations omitted). 
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